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Morphisms of open games
Jules Hedges
Abstract—We define a notion of morphisms between open
games, exploiting a surprising connection between lenses in
computer science and compositional game theory. This extends
the more intuitively obvious definition of globular morphisms as
mappings between strategy profiles that preserve best responses,
and hence in particular preserve Nash equilibria. We construct
a symmetric monoidal double category in which the horizontal
1-cells are open games, vertical 1-morphisms are lenses, and 2-
cells are morphisms of open games. States (morphisms out of the
monoidal unit) in the vertical category give a flexible solution
concept that includes both Nash and subgame perfect equilibria.
Products in the vertical category give an external choice operator
that is reminiscent of products in game semantics, and is useful
in practical examples. We illustrate the above two features with a
simple worked example from microeconomics, the market entry
game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Open games provide a foundation to (economic) game the-
ory that is strongly compositional. In general open games are
fragments of games that can be composed either sequentially
or in parallel. Key to this is the step of viewing open open
games as the morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category.
(This is an instance of the more general research programme
of categorical open systems [5].)
However, there are reasons that one might also wish to view
open games as the objects of a category. Most obviously, we
would like to characterise certain open games using universal
properties, in order to reason about them in a more abstract
way. In this paper we define a general notion of morphisms
between open games, which we call contravariant lens mor-
phisms. This heavily makes use of the factorisation of open
games in terms of polymorphic lenses introduced in [9].
We prove that open games and contravariant lens morphisms
form a symmetric monoidal pseudo double category [17], the
expected structure of 2-cells between arbitrary morphisms in
a symmetric monoidal category. Open games and globular
morphisms (morphisms between open games of the same type)
moreover form a symmetric monoidal bicategory, however we
argue by example that the more general double-categorical
structure is useful.
There are many possible inequivalent ways to define mor-
phisms between open games, and we argue in favour of
contravariant lens morphisms in particular by identifying two
attractive properties. Firstly states of open games, that is
morphisms out of the monoidal unit open game, provide a
fully compositional solution concept that subsumes both Nash
and subgame perfect equilibria in a flexible way. Secondly,
categorical products of open games correspond to an external
choice operator that is highly reminiscent of products in
game semantics, and is useful in practical examples. This
paper culminates in a worked example that illustrates both
of these aspects, in which we describe the market entry game,
a simple but important example of game theory as applied to
microeconomics.
An alternative definition of morphisms between open games
is given in [7], in order to characterise repeated games as
final coalgebras of a functor prepending one additional stage.
Contravariant lens morphisms are inferior for this purpose, but
on the other hand, the two attractive properties of contravariant
lens morphisms identified are not shared by the morphisms of
[7]. This suggests that there is no single, canonical notion
of morphisms between open games, but at least two with
different useful properties. It is expected, however, that all
‘reasonable’ definitions of morphisms between open games
will form a symmetric monoidal double category, and will
agree on globular morphisms.
II. NORMAL-FORM AND EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES
In this section we recall some basic definitions and results
of game theory, which can be found in any standard textbook,
such as [6].
Definition 1. An n-player normal form game consists of the
following data:
• A sequence of sets X1, . . . , Xn of choices for each player
• A payoff function
k :
n∏
i=1
Xi → R
n
giving a real-valued payoff for each player given choices
by each player
A (pure) strategy for player i in a normal form game is simply
a choice σi : Xi, and a (pure) strategy profile σ :
∏n
i=1Xi is
a choice of strategy for each player.
The adjective ‘pure’ means ‘deterministic’, in contrast with
‘mixed’ or probabilistic strategies. The equivalence of strate-
gies and choices characterises a normal form game as both
deterministic and simultaneous: in the probabilistic setting
a strategy is a probability distribution over choices, and in
a dynamic (sequential) game a strategy is a function from
observations to choices.
Given a tuple x :
∏n
i=1Xi, we write xi : Xi for the ith
projection,
x−i :
∏
1≤j≤n
j 6=i
Xj
for the projection onto all but the ith component, and
(x′i, x−i) :
n∏
j=1
Xj
for the modification of x with ith component x′i : Xi. (This
notation is slightly imprecise, but is both useful and standard
in game theory.)
Definition 2. Given a normal form game ((Xi)
n
i=1, q), let
Σ =
∏n
i=1Xi be its set of strategy profiles. We define the
best response relation B ⊆ Σ × Σ by (σ, σ′) ∈ B iff for all
players 1 ≤ i ≤ n and all xi : Xi,
(k (σ′i, σ−i))i ≥ (k (xi, σ−i))i
A pure strategy profile is called a (pure) Nash equilibrium if
it is a fixpoint of the best response relation, that is, if (σ, σ) ∈
B.
Equivalently, σ is a Nash equilibrium iff for all players 1 ≤
i ≤ n and all unilateral deviations x′i : Xi,
(k(σ))i ≥ (k (x
′
i, σ−i))i
In words, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in which
no player can strictly increase their payoff by unilaterally
deviating to another pure strategy. (‘Unilateral’ means that the
strategy profiles of all other players remain fixed.)
Definition 3. An n-player game extensive form game is a
tree where
• Each non-leaf node is labelled by a player, who makes
the decision at that node
• Each leaf node is labelled by an n-tuple of real payoffs
• Each edge is labelled by an action, such that no two
outgoing edges of a single node are labelled by the same
action
• The nodes of the tree are partitioned into information
sets
An information set is a nonempty subset of nodes such that
• Any pair of nodes in the same information set are labelled
by the same player
• Any pair of nodes in the same information set have the
same set of actions labelling their successors
A game of perfect information is an extensive form game
whose information sets are all singletons.
In section VII we will define a simpler subclass of games
of perfect information called sequential games.
Definition 4. A strategy for a player i in an extensive-form
game is a map that takes each information set x owned by
player i, to a choice of action among successors of nodes in
x. A strategy profile is a tuple of strategies for each player.
A strategy profile induces a play, which is a path from
the root node to a leaf node. Plays are in bijection with leaf
nodes, and so each strategy profile determines a payoff for
each player.
Definition 5. Each n-player extensive form game induces
an n-player normal form game called its normalisation or
strategic form as follows. The set of choices for player i in
the normalisation is defined to be the set of strategies for that
player in the original game. The payoffs k are determined by
the play associated to the strategy profile. A Nash equilibrium
of an extensive form game is a strategy profile that is a Nash
equilibrium of its normalisation.
Definition 6. A subgame of an extensive form game G is a
subtree H with the property that if x is any node in H, then
any node in G in the same information set as x is also in
H. The subtree H inherits the structure of an extensive form
game from G.
A subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive form game
is a strategy profile that restricts to a Nash equilibrium on
every subgame.
(This definition implies that the root node of a subgame
must be in a singleton information set.)
We will see an example illustrating these definitions in
section IX.
The remainder of this section considers a simplified special
case of perfect information games, taken from [3], [4].
Definition 7. An n-player sequential game is an extensive-
form game of perfect information in which at level i of the
tree all choices are made by player i, and in which any two
nodes at the same level have the same set of actions available.
The second condition implies that the tree of a sequential
game is balanced. An n-player sequential game is equivalently
defined by sets X1, . . . , Xn of actions, and a payoff function
k :
∏n
i=1Xi → R
n. Subgames are in bijection with partial
plays x1, . . . , xi−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A strategy for player i is a
function
σi :
i∏
j=1
Xj → Xi
and a strategy profile is a tuple
σ :
n∏
i=1

 i∏
j=1
Xj → Xi


Definition 8. Let (Xi)
n
i=1 be a sequence of sets for n ≥ 1.
Let 1 ≤ p ≤ q ≤ n. For a sequence
x :
q−1∏
j=1
Xi
and a sequence of functions
σ :
n∏
i=p

i−1∏
j=1
Xj → Xi


we define a sequence
vσx :
n∏
i=1
Xi
extending x, called the strategic extension of x by σ, by the
course-of-values recursion
(vσx )i =
{
xi if i < q
σi((v
σ
x )1, . . . , (v
σ
x )i−1) if i ≥ q
With this notation, a strategy profile σ of a sequential game
is a Nash equilibrium iff(
k
(
vσ
(vσ)i−11 ,σ
′
i
((vσ)i−11 )
))
i
≥
(
k
(
vσ
(vσ)i−11 ,xi
))
i
for all players 1 ≤ i ≤ n and deviations xi : Xi. It is a
subgame-perfect equilibrium iff for all players 1 ≤ i ≤ n, all
subgames x1, . . . , xi−1 and all deviations xi : Xi,(
k
(
vσx1,...,xi−1
))
i
≥
(
k
(
vσx1,...,xi−1,xi
))
i
III. THE CATEGORY OF LENSES
In this section we recall and extend ideas from [9] on lenses.
Definition 9. Let X,S, Y,R be sets. A lens λ : (X,S) →
(Y,R) consists of a pair of functions vλ : X → Y , uλ :
X ×R→ S.
We refer to such a pair (X,S) as a diset. We write Φ,Ψ,Θ
to refer to disets. This is not really a formal notion, but it
carries a connotation that X should be thought of ‘covariantly’
and S ‘contravariantly’. (To say of a category C that its objects
are disets is really to say that there is an identity-on-objects
functor Set× Setop → C.)
This definition of lens is called concrete lenses in [15],
and is essentially polymorphic lenses in the absence of a
polymorphic typesystem. The relationship between this and
the more familiar monomorphic lenses is discussed in [9].
Proposition 1. There is a category Lens whose objects are
disets and whose morphisms are lenses. The identity lens
(X,S) → (X,S) consists of the identity function X → X
and the right projection X × S → S. The composition of
λ : (X,S) → (Y,R) and µ : (Y,R) → (Z,Q) is given by
vµ◦λ = vµ ◦ vλ and uµ◦λ(x, q) = uλ(x, uµ(vλ(x), q)).
Proof. Routine.
Proposition 2. v defines a fibration V : Lens→ Set.
Proof. See appendix.
For each set X there is a left-multiplication comonad
(X×) : Set → Set. The co-kleisli category of this comonad
has objects sets and morphisms
homco-kl(X×)(R,S) = X ×R→ S
Every function f : X → Y induces an identity-on-objects
functor f∗ : co-kl(Y×)→ co-kl(X×), where the maps
f∗ : homco-kl(Y×)(R,S)→ homco-kl(X×)(R,S)
are given by f∗(u)(x, r) = u(f(x), r). Thus we have a
pseudofunctor co-kl(−×) : Setop → Cat.
Proposition 3. V−1(X) ∼= co-kl(X×)op for each set X , and
for f : X → Y the reindexing functor f∗ : V−1(Y ) →
V−1(X) is the opposite functor of that given above.
Proof. See appendix.
The simple fibration s(Set)→ Set is a fibration that plays
a central role in the categorical semantics of simple type theory
[10, section 1.3]. The category s(Set) has as objects pairs of
sets, and as morphisms (X,S) → (Y,R) pairs of functions
X → Y and X × S → R.
Proposition 4. V is the fibrewise opposite of the simple
fibration s(Set)→ Set.
Proof. The fibre of s(Set) over X is the kleisli category
co-kl(X×) [10, exercise 1.3.4]. Proving this is essentially the
same as the above proof.
Proposition 5. There is an identity-on-objects functor (−,−) :
Set × Setop → Lens defined by v(f,g) = f and u(f,g) =
g ◦ pi2.
Proof. Routine.
Note that this functor is ‘almost’ faithful, but there are
counterexamples involving the empty set. For example, take
the unique function f : 0 → 1 and the two functions
g1 6= g2 : 1 → 2 = {L,R}. Then there is an equality of
lenses (f, g1) = (f, g2) : (0, 2) → I . In [9] the category of
nonempty sets is identified with a subcategory of the category
of lenses based on nonempty sets.
Next, we define a symmetric monoidal structure of Lens.
Definition 10. We define the monoidal product of disets to be
(X,S) ⊗ (X ′, S′) = (X × X ′, S × S′), with monoidal unit
I = (1, 1). Given lenses λ : Φ → Ψ and λ′ : Φ′ → Ψ′, we
define a lens λ⊗ λ′ : Φ⊗ Φ′ → Ψ⊗Ψ′ by
vλ⊗λ′ (x, x
′) = (vλ(x), vλ′ (x
′))
uλ⊗λ′((x, x
′), (r, r′)) = (uλ(x, r), uλ′ (x
′, r′))
We define the structure morphisms of Lens to be the image
under (−,−) of the corresponding structure morphisms of the
cartesian monoidal category Set× Setop. That is to say,
a(X,S),(X′,S′),(X′′,S′′) = (aX,X′,X′′ , a
−1
S,S′,S′′)
l(X,S) = (lX , l
−1
S )
r(X,S) = (rX , r
−1
S )
s(X,S),(X′,S′) = (sX,X′ , s
−1
S,S′)
Proposition 6. Lens is a symmetric monoidal category.
Proof. Instead of proving the Mac Lane axioms directly,
we show that this monoidal structure results from a simpler
symmetric monoidal structure on the fibres V−1(X), by the
Grothendieck construction for symmetric monoidal categories
[16, theorem 12.7].
co-kl(X) has finite products, given by cartesian products
of sets. Consequently, cartesian products of sets give co-
products in co-kl(X×)op. The reindexing functors (f∗)op :
co-kl(Y×)op → co-kl(X×)op are identity-on-objects, and so
preserve finite coproducts. This means in particular that the
fibres V−1(X) are symmetric monoidal and the reindexing
functors are strong monoidal, and the base category Set is
cartesian monoidal, and so the Grothendieck construction can
be applied.
IV. OPEN GAMES AND MORPHISMS
Proposition 7. There is a functor K : Lensop → Set, called
the continuation functor, defined on disets by K(X,S) =
X → S, and on lenses λ : (X,S)→ (Y,R) by K(λ)(k)(x) =
uλ(x, k(vλ(x))).
Proof. Routine.
Definition 11. The context functor C : Lens × Lensop →
Set is defined by C(Φ,Ψ) = V(Φ)×K(Ψ).
Although we could see C as a profunctor Lens → Lens,
this will not be a helpful point of view.
Proposition 8. homLens(I, (X,S)) ∼= X defines a represen-
tation V ∼= homLens(I,−), and homLens((X,S), I) ∼= X →
S defines a representation K ∼= homLens(−, I).
Proof. Routine.
We summarise this by the slogan that in the category of
lenses, states (morphisms from I) are points, and effects
(morphisms to I) are continuations.
For convenience, we will immediately redefine V and K to
be equal to these hom-functors, so that we can write their
action on lenses in terms of lens composition.
Definition 12. Let Φ,Ψ be disets. An open game G : Φ 7−→ Ψ
consists of the following data:
• A set Σ(G) of strategy profiles
• For every σ : Σ(G), a lens G(σ) : Φ→ Ψ
• For every c : C(Φ,Ψ), a best response relation B(c) ⊆
Σ(G)× Σ(G)
We call a pair c = (h, k) : C(Φ,Ψ) a context for G, where
h : V(Φ) is the history and k : K(Ψ) the continuation. We
also write s(G) = Φ and t(G) = Ψ for the source and target
of G.
The equivalence between this definition and the more con-
crete definition in [8, section 2.1.4] (over the category of sets)
is easy to see. If Φ = (X,S) and Ψ = (Y,R) then the
family of lenses G(σ) is the same as the play and coplay
functions Σ(G) → (X → Y ), Σ(G) → (X × R → S). By
the isomorphisms V(Φ) ∼= X and K(Ψ) ∼= Y → R, the best
response relation can equivalently be written as a function
X × (Y → R)→ (Σ(G)→ P(Σ(G))), where P is powerset.
We note that given a pair of games G,G′ : Φ 7−→ Ψ of
the same type, there is an obvious way to define morphisms
between them.
Definition 13. Let G,G′ : Φ 7−→ Ψ be open games. A globular
morphism α : G → G′ is a function Σ(α) : Σ(G) → Σ(G′)
such that
• G(σ) = G(Σ(α)(σ)) for all σ : Σ(G)
• If (σ, σ′) ∈ BG(c) then (Σ(α)(σ),Σ(α)(σ
′)) ∈ BG′(c)
It is expected that all reasonable definitions of general
morphisms between open games will agree on the globular
morphisms. However it is demonstrated by example, both in
this paper and in [7], that the more general morphisms are
necessary. The morphisms we define in this paper are very
different to those in [7], but indeed agree on the globular
morphisms.
The following definition is the key definition of this paper.
Definition 14. Let G : Φ 7−→ Ψ and G : Φ′ 7−→ Ψ′ be open
games. A contravariant lens morphism α : G → G′ consists
of the following data:
• Lenses s(α) : Φ′ → Φ and t(α) : Ψ′ → Ψ
• A function Σ(α) : Σ(G)→ Σ(G′)
satisfying the following two axioms:
• For all σ : Σ(G), the following diagram in Lens
commutes:
Φ Ψ
Φ′ Ψ′
G(σ)
G′(Σ(α)(σ))
s(α) t(α)
• For all (h, k) : C(Φ′,Ψ) and all σ, σ′ : Σ(G), if
(σ, σ′) ∈ BG(s(α) ◦ h, k)
then
(Σ(α)(σ),Σ(α)(σ′)) ∈ BG′(h, k ◦ t(α))
We call a pair (h, k) : C(Φ′,Ψ) a context for α.
We represent a contravariant lens morphism α : G → G′ as
a square
Φ Ψ
Φ′ Ψ′
G
Σ(G)
G′
Σ(G′)
s(α) t(α)Σ(α)
anticipating the double category structure.
Having done the work of representing open games in terms
of lenses, this definition is almost automatic, but with one
crucial twist: the lenses s(α) and t(α) go in the opposite
direction to α. If they were covariant then the resulting
definition would be similar to that of [7] and have many
features in common, including the elegant representation of
repeated games. However, we will demonstrate in this paper
that the alternative definition has several attractive features.
We give the definition the more specific name contravariant
lens morphism to distinguish it from alternatives, but since this
definition is the subject of this paper, we will simply refer to
it as a morphism from now.
Proposition 9. Open games and morphisms form a category
Gamev, with identities and composition lifted from Set and
Lens.
Proof. Routine.
The symbol Gamev is mnemonic for vertical, hinting that
this will be the vertical category of our double category. (Note
that we follow the orientation convention of [17].)
Proposition 10. Let G,G′ : Φ 7−→ Ψ be open games.
Then globular morphisms G → G′ as previously defined are
equivalent to morphisms α : G → G′ with s(α) = idΦ and
t(α) = idΨ.
Proof. Trivial.
Proposition 11.
• s : Game → Lensop is an opfibration whose opcarte-
sian liftings are t-vertical and Σ-vertical
• t : Game → Lensop is a fibration whose cartesian
liftings are s-vertical and Σ-vertical
• Σ : Game→ Set is a fibration whose cartesian liftings
are s-vertical and t-vertical
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 12. There is a fibred forgetful functor from
the fibration Σ : Game → Set to the family fibration
Fam(Lens)→ Set, that forgets best response.
Proof. Routine.
V. THE DOUBLE CATEGORY OF OPEN GAMES
A double category [12] is defined as an internal category
object in the category of large categories and functors. (Com-
pare that a 2-category is defined as a category enriched over
categories.) Equivalently, a 2-category contains four sorts of
things: objects, horizontal 1-cells, vertical 1-morphisms, and
2-cells. Given a pair of horizontal 1-cells F : X 7−→ Y ,
G : W 7−→ Z , a 2-cell α : F → G consists of a pair of
vertical 1-morphisms f : X → W , g : Y → X between the
objects, and a square
X Y
W Z
G
H
f g⇓ α
In this paper we are concerned with pseudo double cate-
gories, in which the vertical morphisms form a category, but
the horizontal morphisms form a category only up to invertible
2-cells. Hence, there is a category of vertical morphisms and
a bicategory of horizontal morphisms.
A standard example of a double category has as objects
sets, horizontal 1-cells relations, vertical 1-cells functions and
2-cells inclusion. Another has as objects categories, horizontal
1-cells profunctors, vertical 1-cells functors and 2-cells natural
transformations. We will show that there is a double category
whose 1-cells are disets, horizontal 1-cells are open games,
vertical 1-cells are reversed lenses, and 2-cells are contravari-
ant lens morphisms.
In this paper we mostly follow the notation of [17], which
gives an explicit definition of symmetric monoidal pseudo
double categories.
Definition 15. Let Φ be a diset. We define an open game
u(Φ) : Φ 7−→ Φ by Σ(u(Φ)) = 1, u(Φ)(∗) = idΦ and (∗, ∗) ∈
Bu(Φ)(c) for all contexts c : C(Φ,Φ).
Proposition 13. For each lens λ : Φ→ Ψ there is a morphism
of open games u(λ) : u(Ψ) → u(Φ) defined by s(u(λ)) =
t(u(λ)) = λ and Σ(u(λ)) = id1. Then u defines a functor
Lens
op → Gamev.
Proof. Trivial.
Definition 16. Let G : Φ 7−→ Ψ and H : Ψ 7−→ Θ be open
games. The open game H⊙ G : Φ 7−→ Θ is defined by
• Σ(H⊙ G) = Σ(G)× Σ(H)
• (H⊙ G)(σ, τ) = H(τ) ◦ G(σ)
• ((σ, τ), (σ′, τ ′)) ∈ BH⊙G(h, k) iff
(σ, σ′) ∈ BG(h, k ◦ H(τ))
and
(τ, τ ′) ∈ BH(G(σ) ◦ h, k)
In the previous section we noted that the definition of
open games in this paper is equivalent to that of [8]. Under
this equivalence, the composition H ⊙ G corresponds to the
definition H ◦N G in [8, sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4], in which
the continuation k ◦ H(τ) of G in the previous definition is
referred to as kτ◦. This is a primitive form of sequential play,
which will be illustrated in practice in the last section of this
paper.
Proposition 14. Let Φ
G
7−→ Ψ
H
7−→ Θ and Φ′
G′
7−→ Ψ′
H′
7−→ Θ′
be open games, and let α : G → G′ and β : H → H′ be
morphisms such that t(α) = s(β). Then there is a morphism
β ⊙ α : H ⊙ G → H′ ⊙ G′ defined by s(β ⊙ α) = s(α),
t(β ⊙ α) = t(β) and Σ(β ⊙ α) = Σ(α)× Σ(β).
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 15. ⊙ defines a functor
Game×Lensop Game→ Game
where the pullback is over
Game
s
−→ Lensop
t
←− Game
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 16. There are globular natural isomorphisms
aI,H,G : (I ⊙H)⊙ G
∼=
−→ I ⊙ (H⊙ G)
lG : u(t(G)) ⊙ G
∼=
−→ G
rG : G ⊙ u(s(G))
∼=
−→ G
Proof. Each of these morphisms is over the correspond-
ing structure morphism of the cartesian monoidal category
Set.
Proposition 17. The above structures form a pseudo double
category whose category of objects is Lensop and whose
category of morphisms is Gamev.
Proof. See appendix.
It follows immediately that open games and globular mor-
phisms form a bicategory. The equivalence relation ∼ on
games defined in [8, section 2.2.2] is precisely the relation of
globular isomorphism, and the category Game(Set) is pre-
cisely the category of horizontal morphisms modulo globular
isomorphism.
Definition 17. Let Φ1,Φ2 be disets. Since V(Φ1 ⊗ Φ2) ∼=
V(Φ1)× V(Φ2), we have projections
V(Φ1)
pi1←− V(Φ1 ⊗ Φ2)
pi2−→ V(Φ2)
Definition 18. Let Φ,Φ′,Ψ,Ψ′ be disets. We define functions
L : homLens(Φ
′,Ψ′)→ (C(Φ⊗ Φ′,Ψ⊗Ψ′)→ C(Φ,Ψ))
R : homLens(Φ,Ψ)→ (C(Φ⊗Ψ
′,Ψ⊗Ψ′)→ C(Φ′,Ψ′))
by
L(λ′)(h, k) = (pi1(h), k ◦ (Ψ⊗ (λ
′ ◦ pi2(h))) ◦ r
−1
Ψ )
R(λ)(h, k) = (pi2(h), k ◦ ((λ ◦ pi1(h))⊗Ψ
′) ◦ l−1Ψ′ )
These continuations are, more explicitly,
Ψ
r
−1
Ψ−−→ Ψ⊗ I
Ψ⊗pi2(h)
−−−−−−→ Ψ⊗ Φ′
Ψ⊗λ′
−−−→ Ψ⊗Ψ′
k
−→ I
Ψ′
l
−1
Ψ′−−→ I ⊗Ψ′
pi1(h)⊗Ψ
′
−−−−−−→ Φ⊗Ψ′
λ⊗Ψ′
−−−→ Ψ⊗Ψ′
k
−→ I
Proposition 18. Let Ξ
κ
−→ Φ
λ
−→ Ψ
µ
−→ Θ and Ξ′
κ′
−→ Φ′
λ′
−→
Ψ′
µ′
−→ Θ′ be lenses. Then the following diagram commutes:
C(Ξ,Θ) C(Ξ⊗ Ξ′,Θ⊗Θ′) C(Ξ′,Θ′)
C(Φ,Ψ) C(Φ⊗ Φ′,Ψ⊗Ψ′) C(Φ′,Ψ′)
L(µ′ ◦ λ′ ◦ κ′) R(µ ◦ λ ◦ κ)
L(λ′) R(λ)
C(κ, µ) C(κ⊗ κ′, µ⊗ µ′) C(κ′, µ′)
Proof. See appendix.
Definition 19. Let G1 : Φ1 7−→ Ψ1 and G2 : Φ2 7−→ Ψ2 be
open games. We define an open game G1 ⊗G2 : Φ1 ⊗Φ2 7−→
Ψ1 ⊗Ψ2 by
• Σ(G1 ⊗ G2) = Σ(G1)× Σ(G2)
• (G1 ⊗ G2)(σ1, σ2) = G1(σ1)⊗ G2(σ2)
• ((σ1, σ2), (σ
′
1, σ
′
2)) ∈ BG1⊗G2(c) iff
(σ1, σ
′
1) ∈ BG1(L(G2(σ2))(c))
and
(σ2, σ
′
2) ∈ BG2(R(G1(σ1))(c))
Continuing the connection between definitions in this pa-
per and those of [8], this definition corresponds to [8, sec-
tion 2.2.7], also denoted G1 ⊗ G2. It is a primitive form
of simultaneous play. The continuation parts of the con-
texts L(G2(σ2))((h1, h2), k) and R(G1(σ1))((h1, h2), k) are
respectively referred to as k⊗σ2(h2) and kσ1(h1)⊗.
Proposition 19. Let α1 : G1 → G
′
1 and α2 : G2 → G
′
2 be
morphisms of open games. Then there is a morphism α1⊗α2 :
G1 ⊗G2 → G
′
1 → G
′
2 defined by s(α1 ⊗α2) = s(α1)⊗ s(α2),
t(α1⊗α2) = t(α1)⊗t(α2), and Σ(α1⊗α2) = Σ(α1)×Σ(α2).
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 20. ⊗ defines a functor Gamev ×Gamev →
Gamev.
Proof. Trivial.
Proposition 21. There are natural isomorphisms
αG,H,I : (G ⊗H)⊗ I
∼=
−→ G ⊗ (H⊗ I)
λG : u(I)⊗ G
∼=
−→ G
ρG : G ⊗ u(I)
∼=
−→ G
σG,H : G ⊗H
∼=
−→ H⊗ G
Proof. These are the same as the structure morphisms in the
symmetric monoidal category Lensop×Set×Lensop, where
Set is cartesian monoidal. It is routine to verify that these still
natural isomorphisms in Gamev.
Proposition 22. Gamev is a symmetric monoidal category.
Proof. Routine.
Proposition 23. s, t : Game→ Lensop are strict symmetric
monoidal functors.
Proof. Trivial.
Proposition 24. There are globular isomorphisms
UX1,X2 : u(X1 ⊗X2)
∼=
−→ u(X1)⊗ u(X2)
and
XG1,G2,H1,H2 : (H1⊗H2)⊙(G1⊗G2)
∼=
−→ (H1⊙G1)⊗(H2⊙G2)
Proof. See appendix.
Theorem 1. Disets, open games and morphisms form a
symmetric monoidal pseudo double category.
Proof. See appendix.
Note that we cannot immediately apply [17, theorem 5.1]
to deduce that the horizontal bicategory is also symmetric
monoidal, because the horizontal bicategory is not framed
[16]. However, the hypotheses of this theorem appear to
be stronger than necessary: all vertical isomorphisms, which
includes the structure morphisms of the symmetric monoidal
structure, have companions and conjoints. This will not impact
us in practice, because we will work directly with the double
category rather than the bicategory structure.
A common (and reasonable) complaint has been that little
game-theoretic information can be obtained from the string di-
agram alone. For example, no information about the equilibria
of a game can be understood from its string diagram. Thus,
despite having a graphical language, in order to answer any
nontrivial question about an open game given its diagram it
is still necessary to explicitly calculate the denotation, which
is tedious and error-prone, and makes compositionality much
less useful in practice.
It is expected that a monoidal double category supports
a 3-dimensional graphical calculus of surface diagrams. To
completely formalise these claims appears to still require a
large amount of foundational work, however.
Having obtained a higher-dimensional categorical language
that is fully compositional and has the potential to be graph-
ical, the next step is to formalise interesting game-theoretic
concepts using this language. This is the subject of the
remainder of this paper. The long-term aim towards which
we are working is to be able to reason about game-theoretic
concepts using nothing but surface diagrams.
VI. STATES OF OPEN GAMES
Definition 20. Let G : Φ 7−→ Ψ be an open game. A state
of G is a pair (σ, k) where σ : Σ(G) and k : K(Ψ) with the
property that for all h : V(Φ), (σ, σ) ∈ BG(h, k). We also
say that σ is a state of G over k. We write S(G) for the set of
states of G.
Informally, a state consists of a choice of continuation
and a choice of strategy that is a Nash equilibrium for that
continuation, for all histories. As we will see, this combines
aspects of Nash and subgame perfect equilibria in a flexible
way. The definition of states is a weakening of the definition of
solution considered in [8, section 3.3], in which σ may depend
on k, but not on h. The latter is more game-theoretically
plausible (because many open games have interesting solutions
in this sense), but is incompatible with ⊗ and hence not fully
compositional. The definition of state is intended as a compro-
mise between game-theoretic usefulness and compositionality.
Proposition 25. Let α : G → G′ be a morphism of open
games, and let σ be a state of G over k. Then Σ(α)(σ) is
a state of G′ over t(α) ◦ k. Thus we have a function S(α) :
S(G)→ S(G′).
Proof. Let h : V(s(G′)). Since σ is a state of G over k, we
have
(σ, σ) ∈ BG(s(α) ◦ h, k)
Since α is a morphism, it follows that
(Σ(α)(σ),Σ(α)(σ)) ∈ BG′(h, k ◦ t(α))
Proposition 26. S defines a functor Gamev → Set.
Proof. Routine.
Theorem 2. S ∼= homGamev (u(I),−).
Proof. States (σ, k) of G are in bijection with morphisms α :
u(I) → G, as follows. There is a unique choice s(α) = k ◦
G(σ) satisfying the first axiom. Since by definition (∗, ∗) ∈
Bu(I)(c) for all c : C(I, I), and all split contexts for α are of
the form (h, idI) for h : V(Φ), the second axiom is equivalent
to the condition that (σ, σ) ∈ BG(h, k) for all h : V(Φ).
This is summarised in the diagram
I I
Φ Ψ
u(I)
1
G
ΣG
k ◦ G(σ) kσ
Noting that u(I) is the monoidal unit of Gamev, states of
open games are indeed states in the more general sense of
monoidal categories.
Corollary 1 (Backward induction). Let G and H be open
games with t(G) = s(H). Let τ be a state of H over k, and
let σ be a state of G over k ◦ H(τ). Then (σ, τ) is a state of
H⊙ G over k.
As its name suggests, the previous result is similar to the
backward induction method of game theory, although in a far
more general form. The intuition is that we first fix the strategy
profile τ of H, and then players in G reason as though players
in H play τ .
Corollary 2. Let G1 and G2 be open games. Let σ1 be a state
of G1 over k1, and let σ2 be a state of G2 over k2. Then
(σ1, σ2) is a state of G1 ⊗ G2 over k1 ⊗ k2.
Definition 21. An open game G : Φ 7−→ Ψ is called
strategically trivial if it satisfies the following two properties:
• Σ(G) ∼= 1
• (∗, ∗) ∈ BG(h, k) for all contexts (h, k) : C(Φ,Ψ)
Since a strategically trivial open game G : (X,S) 7−→
(Y,R) is defined up to globular isomorphism by its lens
G(∗) : (X,S) → (Y,R), the (horizontal) subcategory of
strategically trivial games is equivalent to Lens. Given a
lens λ : (X,S) → (Y,R), we abuse notation and write
λ : (X,S) 7−→ (Y,R) for the corresponding strategically
trivial open game. In particular, for functions f : X → Y and
g : R→ S we have an open game (f, g) : (X,S) 7−→ (Y,R),
and for each set X there is a strategically trivial open game
ε : (X,X) 7−→ I corresponding to the counit lens [9] with
update function uε(x, ∗) = x.
Proposition 27. Let G : Φ 7−→ Ψ be a strategically trivial
game. Then for every continuation k : K(Ψ), G has exactly
one state over k. In particular, a strategically trivial effect
G : Φ 7−→ I has a unique state.
Proof. The unique morphism is
I I
Φ Ψ
u(I)
1
G
1
k ◦ G(∗) k
Note that the strategically trivial effects (X,S) 7−→ I are
‘internal continuations’, and are in bijection with functions
X → S. These include the utility functions of game theory.
Definition 22. For all sets X and Y we define an open game
DX,Y : (X, 1) 7−→ (Y,R) (where R is the set of real numbers,
interpreted as utility) called a decision, as follows:
• Σ(DX,Y ) = X → Y
• DX,Y (σ) is the unique lens (X, 1) → (Y,R) with
V(DX,Y (σ)) = σ
• (σ, σ′) ∈ DX,Y (h, k) iff k(σ
′(h)) ≥ k(y) for all y : Y
Proposition 28. Let X,Y be sets and k : Y → R. Then there
is a bijective correspondence between
• States of DX,Y over k
• Functions X → argmax(k), where argmax(k) ⊆ Y is
the set of maximising points of k
In particular, if Y is finite then DX,Y has at least one state
over every k.
Proof. The pair (σ, k) is a state of DX,Y iff k(σ(x)) ≥ k(y)
for all x : X and y : Y , which is equivalent to the range of σ
being argmax(k).
The following theorem and its proof are essentially restate-
ments of [8, sections 3.1.2 – 3.1.4]. This is one of the key
connections between open games and classical game theory,
characterising tensor products of decisions as normal form
games.
Theorem 3. Let Y1, . . . , Yn be an indexed family of sets for
n ≥ 1, and let k :
∏n
i=1 Yi → R
n be a function. Then there
is a bijective correspondence between
• States of
⊗n
i=1D1,Yi over k
• Pure Nash equilibria of the n-player normal form game
with outcome function k
Proof. See appendix.
Note that if α1 is a state of DI,Y1 over k1 and α2 is a state
of DI,Y2 over k2 then α1⊗α2 is a state of DI,Y1⊗DI,Y2 over
k1 ⊗ k2. However, the continuation k1 ⊗ k2 corresponds to
a function Y1 × Y2 → R
2 that is ‘separable’, in the sense
that (k1 ⊗ k2)(y1, y2) = (k1(y1), k2(y2)), and hence the
⊗-separable states can only be equilibria of these separable
games. Such games are game-theoretically trivial in the sense
that there is no strategic interaction between players, and so
a game degenerates into a tuple of independent maximisation
problems. Only the ⊗-inseparable states of tensor products of
decisions correspond to nontrivial Nash equilibria.
Despite the abstractions introduced in this paper the proof
of the previous theorem is notably ‘manual’, and so the reader
might be left wondering what the purpose of the abstraction
was. The point of this theorem is that it allows us to talk about
Nash equilibria purely internally in a categorical structure,
which can be combined with the other abstractions we have
introduced in order to later reason about Nash equilibria in
purely abstract terms.
In the last section we will see both of these points illustrated:
a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game must be introduced
‘atomically’ since it cannot be composed from simpler com-
ponents, but once it has been introduced, it can be further
composed using purely categorical methods.
VII. BACKWARD INDUCTION
The previous theorem characterised Nash equilibria of nor-
mal form games in terms of states of open games. In this
section we do the same to Nash and subgame perfect equilibria
of extensive form games of perfect information.
Definition 23. Let n ≥ 1 and let X1, . . . , Xn be a sequence
of sets. We define an open game
D∆X1,...,Xn :
(
n−1∏
i=1
Xi,R
n−1
)
7−→
(
n∏
i=1
Xi,R
n
)
by the string diagram in figure 1, where the black node is the
(strategically trivial) copying open game
(
∆∏n−1
i=1 Xi
, 1
)
:
(
n−1∏
i=1
Xi, 1
)
7−→
(
n−1∏
i=1
Xi ×
n−1∏
i=1
Xi, 1
)
It is routine to check that D∆X1,...,Xn is concretely given
as follows, up to globular isomorphism. The set of strategy
profiles is
Σ
(
D∆X1,...,Xn
)
=
n−1∏
i=1
Xi → Xn
Given σ : Σ
(
D∆X1,...,Xn
)
, the lens D∆X1,...,Xn(σ) has
vD∆
X1,...,Xn
(σ) :
n−1∏
i=1
Xi →
n∏
i=1
Xi, x 7→ (x, σ(x))
D∏n−1
i=1 Xi,Xn
n−1∏
i=1
Xi
Rn−1
n−1∏
i=1
Xi
Xn
Rn−1
R
Fig. 1. Definition of D∆
X1,...,Xn
in terms of D∏n−1
i=1 Xi,Xn
and
uD∆
X1,...,Xn
(σ) :
n−1∏
i=1
Xi × R
n → Rn−1, (x, r) 7→ r−n
For h :
∏n−1
i=1 Xi and k :
∏n
i=1Xi → R
n, the best response
relation
(σ, σ′) ∈ BD∆
X1,...,Xn
(h, k)
holds iff
k(h, σ′(h))n ≥ k(h, xn)n
for all xn : Xn.
We now come to one of the key results of this paper: For
an extensive form game, Nash equilibria correspond to states
in general, and subgame perfect equilibria correspond to ⊙-
separable states. Using this, we can use the category-theoretic
notion of ⊙-separability (which could moreover be visible in
a surface diagram as a glued boundary) to define the game-
theoretic notion of subgame perfection for general open games.
We state and prove the theorem for the special case of finite
sequential games (defined in section II) for simplicity, but we
will see an example in section IX that is not in this special
case.
Theorem 4. Let X1, . . . , Xn be an indexed family of sets for
n ≥ 1, and let k :
∏n
i=1 Yi → R
n. Then there is a bijective
correspondence between:
• States of
⊙n
i=1D
∆
X1,...,Xi
over k
• Pure Nash equilibria of the n-player sequential game
with outcome function k
Moreover there is a bijective correspondence between:
• States of
⊙n
i=1D
∆
X1,...,Xi
over k that are of the form⊙n
i=1 αi, where each αi is a state of D
∆
X1,...,Xi
• Subgame perfect equilibria of the n-player sequential
game with outcome function k
Proof. See appendix.
The previous proof can be equivalently written as a proof by
backward induction, which is a proof by finite bar induction
on the tree of subgames.
In standard game theory, the representation of a game is
typically dissociated from its analysis. On any game of a given
class (for example extensive-form games) one can define a
variety of solution concepts (for example pure Nash equilib-
rium, mixed Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium,
correlated equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilibrium). A curious
fact about open games is that the representation of a model as
an open game automatically ‘builds in’ a particular solution
concept, namely pure Nash equilibrium. This is because the
⊙ and ⊗ operators make essential use of Nash-like reasoning,
in which the players in each component act as though they
know which strategies will be played in the other component.
In particular, it has proven to be difficult to characterise
subgame perfect equilibria, despite the fact that the repre-
sentation of open games appears to be dynamic (that is,
has a temporal component; subgame perfect equilibrium is
specifically intended for dynamic games). A failed attempt
was made in [8] by modifying the operator ⊙, there called
◦SP , but it fails to form a symmetric monoidal category with
⊗, and hence does not support a string diagram language. (See
the conclusion section of [8].)
A direct solution is given in [7] by defining a ‘subgame
perfection operator’ that modifies an open game’s solution
concept from Nash to subgame perfect equilibrium. From a
practical perspective their solution is similar to the one in this
paper, offering flexibility between Nash and subgame perfect
equilibrium. Ours has the specific advantage that it separates
the representation of a game from its analysis, as in standard
game theory.
VIII. LIMITS AND COLIMITS OF LENSES
We will begin, for completeness of presentation, by consid-
ering limits of lenses. However, we will not use them in this
paper.
Let 〈V,K〉 : Lens → Set × Setop be the universal
morphism
Lens
Set× Setop
Set
Set
op
pi1
pi2
V
K
〈V,K〉
Then 〈V,K〉 ⊣ (−,−), since the left adjoint acts on disets by
〈V,K〉 (X,S) = (X,X → S)
and there are natural isomorphisms
homSet×Setop((X,X → S), (Y,R))
= (X → Y )× (R→ (X → S))
∼= (X → Y )× (X ×R→ S)
= homLens((X,S), (Y,R))
Since (−,−) is a right adjoint, it preserves limits. Since
limits in Set × Setop are computed pointwise from limits
and colimits in Set, this allows us to compute various limits
in Lens. For example, products in Lens are given by
∏
i:I
(Xi, Si) =
(∏
i:I
Xi,
∐
i:I
Si
)
More generally, since (X×) : Set → Set preserves col-
imits, co-kl(X×) has all limits, and so the fibres V−1(X) ∼=
co-kl(X×)op have all limits. Moreover, we can show that the
reindexing functors f∗ : V−1(Y )→ V−1(X) preserve limits.
We can then apply [10, exercise 9.2.4] to deduce that Lens
has all limits and V preserves them.
As an application of this, since Lens has pullbacks we can
define a category of symmetric lenses as spans in Lens. This
contrasts with monomorphic lenses, in which pullbacks do not
exist in general unless the put-get law is imposed [11]. This
can be used to give a definition of symmetric lawless lenses. It
may be possible to apply this to develop a more symmetrical
theory of open games, where the horizontal category Game
is generalised from teleological [9] to †-compact closed.
The simplest example of this is that any two objects over 0
in Lens are uniquely isomorphic, and every object over 0 is
initial.
Next we come to colimits. For each set S, let FS : Lens→
Set be the functor given on objects by FS(Y,R) = Y ×(R→
S). Then (−, S) ⊣ FS , since there are natural isomorphisms
homLens((X,S), (Y,R))
= (X → Y )× (X ×R→ S)
= X → Y × (R→ S)
= homSet(X,FS(Y,R))
Since (−, S) is a left adjoint, it preserves colimits. In
particular, Lens has coproducts of the form
∐
i:I
(Xi, S) =
(∐
i:I
Xi, S
)
For example, (1, 0) is terminal in Lens.
Proposition 29. The product in Gamev of a family of open
games
Gi : (Xi, S) 7−→ (Yi, R)
is ∏
i:I
Gi :
(∐
i:I
Xi, S
)
7−→
(∐
i:I
Yi, R
)
given as follows. The set of strategy profiles is
Σ
(∏
i:I
Gi
)
=
∏
i:I
Σ(Gi)
The lenses are given by(∏
i:I
Gi
)
(σ) =
∐
i:I
Gi(σi)
Noting that
V
(∐
i:I
Xi, S
)
∼=
∐
i:I
Xi
the best response relation
(σ, σ′) ∈ B∏
i:I Gi
(ιj(h), k)
holds iff
(σj , σ
′
j) ∈ BGj (h, k ◦ ιj)
The projections pij :
∏
i:I Gi → Gj are given by
(∐
i:I
Xi, S
) (∐
i:I
Yi, R
)
(Xj , S) (Yj , R)
∏
i:I
Gi
∏
i:I
Σ(Gi)
Gj
Σ(Gj)
(ιj , S) (ιj , R)pij
Proof. See appendix.
The product G1 × G2 is an external choice, in which
the decision of whether G1 or G2 is played is determined
by the history. This is strongly reminiscent of products in
categories in game semantics [1] and additive conjunction
in linear logic. In particular, it is typical of products in
game semantics that strategies compose by cartesian product,
and plays compose by disjoint union. This analogy suggests
the following correspondence between game semantics and
compositional game theory: The player of game semantics
corresponds to the n ≥ 0 noncooperative players in an open
game, and the opponent of game semantics corresponds to the
context (h, k).
Proposition 30. Let Gi : (Xi, R) 7−→ (Yi, S) be a family
of open games. Then a state of
∏
i:I Gi consists, up to
isomorphism, of a state for each Gi.
Proof. Since homGamev (u(I),−) preserves limits,
homGamev
(
u(I),
∏
i:I
Gi
)
∼=
∏
i:I
homGamev(u(I),Gi)
IX. EXAMPLE: MARKET ENTRY GAME
We illustrate the previous three sections by considering the
market entry game, a standard example of game theory in
microeconomics [14, example 9.B.3]. This game is played
between two players: a prospective entrant E into a market,
and an incumbent I in that market. In the first stage, E has
the choice to either enter the market, or immediately quit. If
E chooses to quit the game ends immediately. If E chooses
to enter, in the second stage E and I simultaneously choose
E(0, 2) E
I I
(−3,−1) (1,−2) (−2,−1) (3, 1)
Q C
F A
F A F A
Fig. 2. Extensive form representation of market entry game
to either fight or accommodate the other (which could mean,
for example, setting a low or high price).
The extensive form representation is depicted in figure 2.
The dotted line denotes that the two connected nodes share an
information set, meaning that the firm I does not know which
of the two nodes they are in; in this way, the right hand subtree
represents a simultaneous game. (More precisely, the word
‘simultaneous’ means the choices are made independently, but
the physical timing might or might not be simultaneous.)
The feature of this game that is specifically awkward for
approaches based on theoretical computer science is that
the extensive-form tree is unbalanced. Other approaches use
dependent types to allow types of choices to dependent on
earlier values, but can still only allow more general ‘dependent
subgames’ such as in the market entry game using encoding
tricks such as dummy moves, and using large negative utilities
to rule out certain plays. (Examples of game theory developed
in a dependent type system include [13], [2].) An external
choice operator solves the more general problem of dependent
subgames in an elegant way.
We represent the market entry game as an open game as
follows. The decision of the first player (corresponding to
the root node in figure 2) is modelled as a utility-maximising
decision
D1,1+1 : I 7−→ (1 + 1,R)
where the choice ι1(∗) represents not entering the market, and
ι2(∗) represents entering the market.
The left subgame is represented by
(1, c0) : (1,R) 7−→ I
where c0 : 1 → R is the constant function with c0(∗) = 0.
Notice that the utility of 2 for player I in the left subgame
has a clear economic interpretation as the profit for the
incumbent firm, but it plays no role game-theoretically, and
it never appears in the open game representation. (We could
however add an additional utility-maximising player in the left
D1,XD1,X
U
R
X
X
R
R
R
Fig. 3. String diagram for the right subgame G
subgame with only a single choice, which has no effect on
the equilibrium analysis but is more faithful to the economic
situation.) As a strategically trivial effect, (1, c0) has a unique
state αL, given by the unique lenses s(αL) : (1,R) → I ,
t(αL) : I → I and function Σ(αL) : 1→ 1.
The right subgame is an open game
G : (1,R) 7−→ I
which can be built compositionally from a pair of utility-
maximising decisions D1,X : I 7−→ (X,R), where X =
{F,A} is the set containing the choice to fight or accom-
modate, and the utility function U : X × X → R2. This is
represented by the string diagram in figure 3.
By the coherence theorem for teleological categories [9]
this diagram defines G up to (in general non-globular) iso-
morphism. Algebraically, in the terminology of this paper it
is given by
εR ⊙ (u(R, 1)⊗ εR ⊗ u(1,R))
⊙ (U, idR2)
⊙ (u(X, 1)⊗ (id1,∆R))
⊙ (D1,X ⊗ u(1,R))
Concretely, G is given as follows:
• Σ(G) = X2
• G(σ) : (1,R)→ I is the lens with uG(σ)(∗, ∗) = U(σ)1,
i.e. the utility for player E given strategy profile σ for
the subgame
• (σ, σ′) ∈ BG(∗, ∗) iff U(σ
′
1, σ2)1 ≥ U(σ
′
1, σ2)1 and
U(σ1, σ
′
2)2 ≥ U(σ1, σ
′
2)2, where − : X → X gives the
other choice, i.e. BG(∗, ∗) is the best response function
for the right simultaneous game
The right subgame has a unique Nash equilibrium (A,A)
in which both players accommodate. Hence G has a unique
state α2 with Σ(α)(∗) = (A,A), in which the lens s(α2) :
(1,R)→ I has us(α2)(∗, ∗) = 3. This is the payoff U(A,A)1
for player E in the Nash equilibrium.
The product (1, c0) × G : (1 + 1,R) 7−→ (1 + 1, 1) is
concretely given as follows:
• Σ((1, c0)× G) ∼= X ×X
• ((1, c0)× G)(σ) is the lens (1 + 1,R)→ (1 + 1, 1) with
view function
v((1,c0)×G)(σ) = id1+1
and update function
u((1,c0)×G)(σ)(h, ∗) =
{
0 if h = ι1(∗)
U(σ) if h = ι2(∗)
• The best response relation (σ, σ′) ∈ B(1,c0)×G(h, k) iff
either h = ι1(∗), or U(σ
′
1, σ2)1 ≥ U(σ
′
1, σ2)1 and
U(σ1, σ
′
2)2 ≥ U(σ1, σ
′
2)2
Unlike the subgames (1, c0) and G, the product (1, c0)×G
cannot be seen as directly corresponding to a game in the
classical sense. By proposition 30, 〈αL, α2〉 is the unique state
of (1, c0)×G, which is over the unique lens t(〈αL, αR〉) : (1+
1, 1)→ I . It has Σ(〈αL, αR〉)(∗) = (A,A), and s(〈αL, αR〉) :
(1 + 1,R)→ I is the lens with
us(〈αL,αR〉)(h, ∗) =
{
0 if h = ι1(∗)
3 if h = ι2(∗)
Call this lens λ.
Since the previous function has a single maximising point,
namely ι2(∗), by proposition 28 the decision D1,1+1 has a
unique state α over λ. This state has Σ(α)(∗) : 1 → 1 + 1
given by Σ(α)(∗)(∗) = ι2(∗).
The open game
H = ((1, c0)× G)⊙D1,1+1 : I 7−→ (1 + 1, 1)
will be our representation of the original market entry game.
It is concretely given, up to globular isomorphism, as follows.
The set of strategy profiles is
Σ(H) = (1 + 1)×X2
consisting of a strategy for E in the first round, and a strategy
for both players in the subgame in which E enters in the first
round. This is the same as the set of pure strategy profiles
of the original extensive-form game. (As in classical game
theory, player E is required to choose a contingent strategy
for the second round, even if the strategy in the first round is to
quit.) H can be straightforwardly made into a scalar I 7−→ I
by postcomposing with the (unique) strategically trivial game
(1 + 1, 1) 7−→ I .
The lens H(σ1, σ2, σ3) : I → (1 + 1, 1) has view function
vH(σ1,σ2,σ3)(∗) = σ1
The best response relation BH(∗, k) is the same as the best
response relation for the market entry game given by classical
game theory. Concretely, the relation
(σ, σ′) ∈ BH(∗, k)
holds iff the following three conditions hold:
• If σ′1 = ι1(∗) then 0 ≥ U(σ2, σ3)1, and if σ
′
1 = ι2(∗)
then 0 ≤ U(σ2, σ3)1
• If σ1 = ι1(∗) then U(σ
′
2, σ3)1 ≥ U(σ
′
2, σ3)1
• If σ1 = ι1(∗) then U(σ2, σ
′
3)2 ≥ U(σ2, σ
′
3)2
By the previous reasoningH has a unique⊙-separable state,
namely α = 〈αL, αR〉 ⊙ α1. This corresponds to the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium of the market entry game, namely
that the entrant enters the market (choice C or ι2(∗)), and then
both players accommodate (choice A). H has two additional
states that are not ⊙-separable, corresponding to the non-
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the market entry game (or,
equivalently, to the two additional fixpoints of BH(∗, k)). One
of these chooses the strategy profile (ι1(∗), A, F ), the other,
(ι1(∗), F, F ).
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APPENDIX
Proof (proposition 2). It is trivial that V is a functor.
We define the following cleavage for V. Given a function f : X → Y we define f∗(Y,R) = (X,R). The cartesian lifting
f(Y,R) : (X,R)→ (Y,R) is the lens defined by vf(Y,R) = f and uf(Y,R)(x, r) = r.
To show that f(Y,R) is indeed cartesian, let λ : (W,T ) → (Y,R) be a lens such that vλ = f ◦ g for some function
g : W → X . Define another lens µ : (W,T )→ (X,S) by vµ = g and uµ = uλ. Then f(Y,R) ◦ µ = λ, because
vf(Y,R)◦µ = vf(Y,R) ◦ vµ = f ◦ g = vλ
and
uf(Y,R)◦µ(w, r) = uµ(w, uf(Y,R)(vµ(w), r)) = uλ(w, r)
Proof (proposition 3). The fibre V−1(X) by definition has as objects bisets (X,S) and as morphisms lenses λ : (X,S) →
(X,R) with vλ = idX . On the other hand objects of co-kl(X×)
op are sets, and morphisms are
homco-kl(X×)op(S,R) = homco-kl(X×)(R,S) = X ×R→ S
Therefore it can directly be seen that the functor V−1(X) → co-kl(X×)op given by (X,S) 7→ S and λ 7→ uλ is an
isomorphism.
By definition, the reindexing functor f∗ : V−1(Y ) → V−1(X) acts on objects by f∗(Y, S) = (X,S), and takes a lens
λ : (Y, S) → (Y,R) with vλ = idX to f
∗(λ) : (X,S) → (X,R) with vf∗(λ) = idX and uf∗(λ)(x, r) = uλ(f(x), r). This
f∗(λ) is the unique lens making the diagram
(X,S) (Y, S)
(X,R) (Y,R)
f(Y, S)
f(Y,R)
f∗(λ) λ
commute. On the other hand, the functor (f∗)op : co-kl(Y×)op → co-kl(X×)op has maps
(f∗)op : homco-kl(Y×)op(S,R)→ homco-kl(X×)op(S,R)
given by
(f∗)op(u)(x, r) = u(f(x), r)
These can be directly seen to be equal under the isomorphism.
Proof (proposition 11). It is trivial that s, t and Σ are functors. We prove that s is an opfibration, with the others being similar.
Let λ : Φ → Ψ be a lens, so λ : homLensop(Ψ,Φ), and let G be an open game with s(G) = Ψ. Let λ!(G) : Φ 7−→ t(G)
be the open game defined by Σ(λ!(G)) = Σ(G), λ!(G)(σ) = G(σ) ◦ λ and Bλ!(G)(c) = BG(c). λ(G) : G → λ!(G) is the
morphism defined by s(λ(G)) = λ, t(λ(G)) = idt(G) and Σ(λ(G)) = idΣ(G). The morphism axioms can be easily checked.
λ(G) is t-vertical and Σ-vertical by construction.
Let α : G → H be a morphism such that s(α) = λ ◦ µ for some lens µ : s(H) → Φ (hence s(α) = µ ◦ λ for
µ : homLensop(Φ, s(H))). Then there is a morphism β : λ!(G) → H defined by s(β) = µ, t(β) = t(α) and Σ(β) = Σ(α).
The morphism axioms for β follow from those for α, together with λ ◦ µ = s(α). Then
s(β ◦ λ(G)) = s(λ(G)) ◦ s(β) = λ ◦ µ = s(α)
and
t(β ◦ λ(G)) = s(λ(G)) ◦ t(β) = idt(G) ◦t(α) = t(α)
and
Σ(β ◦ λ(G)) = Σ(β) ◦ Σ(λ(G)) = Σ(α) ◦ idΣ(G) = Σ(α)
Therefore β ◦ λ(G) = α. This situation is illustrated in figure 4.
Proof (proposition 14). The first axiom can be checked by diagram pasting:
Ψ t(G)
Φ t(G)
s(H) t(H)
G
Σ(G)
λ!(G)
Σ(G)
H
Σ(H)
λ
µ t(α)Σ(α)
Fig. 4. Illustration of proposition 11
Φ Ψ Θ
Φ′ Ψ′ Θ′
G(σ) H(τ)
G′(Σ(α)(σ)) H′(Σ(β)(τ))
s(α) t(α) = s(β) t(β)
For the second axiom, let (h, k) : C(Φ′,Θ) be a context for β ⊙ α and let σ, σ′ : ΣG and τ, τ
′ : ΣH be strategy profiles.
Suppose
((σ, τ), (σ′, τ ′)) ∈ BH⊙G(s(α) ◦ h, k)
so
(σ, σ′) ∈ BG(s(α) ◦ h, k ◦ H(τ))
and
(τ, τ ′) ∈ BH(G(σ) ◦ s(α) ◦ h, k)
= BH(t(α) ◦ G
′(Σ(α)(σ)) ◦ h, k)
= BH(s(β) ◦ G
′(Σ(α)(σ)) ◦ h, k)
Then
(Σ(α)(σ),Σ(α)(σ′)) ∈ BG′(h, k ◦ H(τ) ◦ t(α))
= BG′(h, k ◦ H(τ) ◦ s(β))
= BG′(h, k ◦ t(β) ◦ H
′(Σ(β)(τ)))
and
(Σ(β)(τ),Σ(β)(τ ′)) ∈ BH′(G
′(Σ(α)(σ)) ◦ h, k ◦ t(β))
Therefore
((Σ(α)(σ),Σ(β)(τ)), (Σ(α)(σ′ ),Σ(β)(τ ′))) ∈ BH′⊙G′(h, k ◦ t(β))
and we are done.
Proof (proposition 15). This amounts to the following distributivity law: let Φ
G
7−→ Ψ
H
7−→ Θ, Φ′
G′
7−→ Ψ′
H′
7−→ Θ′ and
Φ′′
G′′
7−→ Ψ′′
H′′
7−→ Θ′′ be open games, and let G
α
−→ G′
α′
−→ G′′ and H
β
−→ H′
β′
−→ H′′ be refinements such that t(α) = s(β) and
(α′) = s(β′). Then
(β′ ⊙ α′) ◦ (β ⊙ α) = (β′ ◦ β)⊙ (α′ ◦ α)
For the source component,
s((β′ ⊙ α′) ◦ (β ⊙ α)) = s(β′ ⊙ α′) ◦ s(β ⊙ α)
= s(α′) ◦ s(α)
= s(α′ ◦ α)
= s((β′ ◦ β)⊙ (α′ ◦ α))
and similarly for the target component. For the best response component,
Σ((β′ ⊙ α′) ◦ (β ⊙ α))(σ, τ) = Σ(β′ ⊙ α′)(Σ(β ⊙ α)(σ, τ))
= Σ(β′ ⊙ α′)(Σ(α)(σ),Σ(β)(τ))
= (Σ(α′)(Σ(α)(σ)),Σ(β′)(Σ(β)(τ)))
= (Σ(α′ ◦ α)(σ),Σ(β′ ◦ β)(τ))
= (Σ((β′ ◦ β)⊙ (α′ ◦ α))(σ, τ))
Proof (proposition 17). It remains to prove that the following two diagrams (Mac Lane triangle and pentagon) commute:
(H⊙ u(t(G))) ⊙ G H⊙ (u(t(G)) ⊙ G)
H⊙ G
aG,uY ,H
rH ⊙ G
H⊙ lG
((J ⊙ I)⊙H)⊙ G
(J ⊙ (I ⊙H))⊙ G
J ⊙ ((I ⊙H)⊙ G)
(J ⊙ I)⊙ (H⊙ G)
J ⊙ (I ⊙ (H⊙ G))
aJ ,I,H ⊙ G
aJ ,I⊙H,G
aJ⊙I,H,G
aJ ,I,H⊙G
J ⊙ aI,H,G
Each composition path results in a globular morphism. Hence equality of the refinements follows from equality between the
Σ components, which are obtained from the corresponding Mac Lane axioms for the cartesian monoidal category Set.
Proof (proposition 18). The first component
V(Ξ) V(Ξ)× V(Ξ′) V(Ξ′)
V(Φ) V(Φ)× V(Φ′) V(Φ′)
pi1 pi2
pi1 pi2
V(κ) V(κ)× V(κ′) V(κ′)
holds because pi1, pi2 are (isomorphic to) projections from a cartesian product of sets.
For the second component, let h : V(Ξ⊗ Ξ′). We reason that
(Θ⊗ (µ′ ◦ λ′ ◦ κ′ ◦ pi2(h))) ◦ r
−1
Ψ ◦ µ = (Ψ⊗ (λ
′ ◦ pi2((κ⊗ κ
′) ◦ h))) ◦ r−1Ψ ◦ (µ⊗ µ
′)
from which commutativity of the left-hand square follows. (The proof for the right-hand square is symmetric.)
Ψ Θ
Ψ⊗ I Θ⊗ I
Ψ⊗ Φ′ Ψ⊗ Ξ′ Θ⊗ Ξ′
Ψ⊗Ψ′ Θ⊗Θ′
µ
r−1Θr
−1
Ψ
µ⊗ I
Ψ⊗ pi2((κ⊗ κ
′) ◦ h)
Ψ⊗ pi2(h)
Ψ⊗ κ′
Θ⊗ pi2(h)
µ⊗ Ξ′
Ψ⊗ λ′
Ψ⊗ (λ′ ◦ κ′) Θ⊗ (µ′ ◦ λ′ ◦ κ′)
µ⊗ µ′
(∗)
Fig. 5. Commuting diagram used to prove proposition 18
See figure 5. Commutativity of the triangle labelled (∗) follows from chasing h around the right-hand square of the first
component. Commutativity of the top square is naturality of r−1, and the other regions of the diagram commute by functorality
of ⊗.
Proof (proposition 19). For the first axiom, commutativity of the square
s(G1)⊗ s(G2) t(G1)⊗ t(G2)
s(G′1)⊗ s(G
′
2) t(G
′
1)⊗ t(G
′
2)
G1(σ)⊗ G2(τ)
G′1(Σ(α1)(σ)) ⊗ G
′
2(Σ(α2)(τ))
s(α1)⊗ s(α2) t(α1)⊗ t(α2)
follows from the first axioms of α1 and α2.
For the second axiom, let c : C(s(G′1 ⊗G
′
2), t(G1⊗G2)) be a context for α1⊗α2, and let σ1, σ
′
1 : Σ(G1) and σ2, σ
′
2 : Σ(G2)
be strategy profiles such that
((σ1, σ2), (σ
′
1, σ
′
2)) ∈ BG1⊗G2(C(s(α1 ⊗ α2), t(G1 ⊗ G2))(c))
Then
(σ1, σ
′
1) ∈ BG1(L(G2(σ2))(C(s(α1 ⊗ α2), t(G1 ⊗ G2))(c)))
= BG1(C(s(α1), t(G1))(L(G2(σ2) ◦ s(α2))(c)))
= BG1(C(s(α1), t(G1))(L(t(α2) ◦ G
′
2(Σ(α2)(σ2)))(c)))
and
(σ2, σ
′
2) ∈ BG2(R(G1(σ1))(C(s(α1 ⊗ α2), t(G1 ⊗ G2))(c)))
= BG2(C(s(α2), t(G2))(R(G1(σ1) ◦ s(α1))(c)))
= BG2(C(s(α2), t(G2))(R(t(α1) ◦ G
′
1(Σ(α1)(σ1)))(c)))
Therefore
(Σ(α1)(σ1),Σ(α1)(σ
′
1)) ∈ BG′1(C(s(G
′
1), t(α1))(L(t(α2) ◦ G
′
2(Σ(α2)(σ2)))(c)))
= BG′1(L(G
′
2(Σ(α2)(σ2)))(C(s(G
′
1 ⊗ G
′
2), t(α1 ⊗ α2))(c)))
and
(Σ(α2)(σ2),Σ(α2)(σ
′
2)) ∈ BG′2(C(s(G
′
2), t(α2))(R(t(α1) ◦ G
′
1(Σ(α1)(σ1)))(c)))
= BG′2(R(G
′
1(Σ(α1)(σ1)))(C(s(G
′
1 ⊗ G
′
2), t(α1 ⊗ α2))(c)))
These combine to give
((Σ(α1)(σ1),Σ(α2)(σ2)), (Σ(α1)(σ
′
1),Σ(α2)(σ
′
2))) ∈ BG′1⊗G′2(C(s(G
′
1 ⊗ G
′
2), t(α1 ⊗ α2))(c))
as required.
Proof (proposition 24). The first is trivial, with ΣUX1,X2 : 1→ 1× 1, ∗ 7→ (∗, ∗).
For the second we take
ΣX : (Σ(G1)× Σ(G2))× (Σ(H1)× Σ(H2))→ (Σ(G1)× Σ(H1))× (Σ(G2)× Σ(H2)),
((σ1, σ2), (τ1, τ2)) 7→ ((σ1, τ1), (σ2, τ2))
The first axiom follows from bifunctorality of ⊗ on Lens:
(H1(τ1)⊗H2(τ2)) ◦ (G1(σ1)⊗ G2(σ2)) = (H1(τ1) ◦ G1(σ1))⊗ (H2(τ2) ◦ G2(σ2))
For the second axiom we calculate:
(((σ1, σ2), (τ1, τ2)), ((σ
′
1, σ
′
2), (τ
′
1, τ
′
2))) ∈ B(H1⊗H2)⊙(G1⊗G2)(c)
⇐⇒ ((σ1, σ2), (σ
′
1, σ
′
2)) ∈ BG1⊗G2(C(idX1⊗X2 ,H1(τ1)⊗H2(τ2))(c))
and ((τ1, τ2), (τ
′
1, τ
′
2)) ∈ BH1⊗H2(C(G1(σ1)⊗ G2(σ2), idZ1⊗Z2)(c))
⇐⇒ (σ1, σ
′
1) ∈ BG1(L(G2(σ2))(C(idX1⊗X2 ,H1(τ1)⊗H2(τ2))(c)))
and (σ2, σ
′
2) ∈ BG2(R(G1(σ1))(C(idX1⊗X2 ,H1(τ1)⊗H2(τ2))(c)))
and (τ1, τ
′
1) ∈ BH1(L(H2(τ2))(C(G1(σ1)⊗ G2(σ2), idZ1⊗Z2)(c)))
and (τ2, τ
′
2) ∈ BH2(R(H1(τ1))(C(G1(σ1)⊗ G2(σ2), idZ1⊗Z2)(c)))
⇐⇒ (σ1, σ
′
1) ∈ BG1(C(idX1 ,H1(τ1))(L(H2(τ2) ◦ G2(σ2))(c)))
and (τ1, τ
′
1) ∈ BH1(C(G1(σ1), idZ1)(L(H2(τ2) ◦ G2(σ2))(c)))
and (σ2, σ
′
2) ∈ BG2(C(idX2 ,H2(τ2))(R(H1(τ1) ◦ G1(σ1))(c)))
and (τ2, τ
′
2) ∈ BH2(C(G2(σ2), idZ2)(R(H1(τ1) ◦ G1(σ1))(c)))
⇐⇒ ((σ1, τ1), (σ
′
1, τ
′
1)) ∈ BH1⊙G1(L(H2(τ2) ◦ G2(σ2))(c))
and ((σ2, τ2), (σ
′
2, τ
′
2)) ∈ BH2⊙G2(R(H1(τ1) ◦ G1(σ1))(c))
⇐⇒ (((σ1, τ1), (σ2, τ2)), ((σ
′
1, τ
′
1), (σ
′
2, τ
′
2))) ∈ B(H1⊙G1)⊗(H2⊙G2)(c)
The relevant equalities between contexts, which all follow from proposition 18, are summarised in figure 6.
Proof (theorem 1). Following [17], it remains to show that various diagrams commute. These are shown in figures 7, 8, 9 and
10. These are all trivial to prove, by checking the s, t and Σ components separately.
C(X1 ⊗X2, Z1 ⊗ Z2)C(X1, Z1) C(X2, Z2)
C(X1 ⊗X2, Y1 ⊗ Y2)
C(Y1 ⊗ Y2, Z1 ⊗ Z2)
C(X1, Y1) C(X2, Y2)
C(Y1, Z1) C(Y2, Z2)
L(H2(τ2) ◦ G2(σ2))
R(H1(τ1) ◦ G1(σ1))
L(G2(σ2))
R(G1(σ1))
L(H2(τ2))
R(H1(τ1))
C(idX1⊗X2 ,H1(τ1)⊗H2(τ2))
C(G1(σ1)⊗ G2(σ2), idZ1⊗Z2)
C(idX1 ,H1(τ1))
C(G1(σ1), idZ1)
C(idX2 ,H2(τ2))
C(G2(σ2), idZ2)
Fig. 6. Instances of proposition 18 used in proof of proposition 24
Proof (theorem 3). We prove by induction on n that the open game
n⊗
i=1
D1,Yi : I 7−→
(
n∏
i=1
Yi,R
n
)
is concretely given, up to unique natural isomorphism, as follows. Its set of strategy profiles is
Σ
(
n⊗
i=1
D1,Yi
)
=
n∏
i=1
Yi
The lens (
n⊗
i=1
D1,Yi
)
(σ) : I →
(
n∏
i=1
Yi,R
n
)
is the unique one with
V
((
n⊗
i=1
D1,Yi
)
(σ)
)
= σ
The best response relation
(σ, σ′) ∈ B⊗n
i=1 D1,Yi
(h, k)
holds iff, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n and all yj : Yj ,
k(σ′j , σ−j)j ≥ k(yj , σ−j)j
The result follows, since the set of strategy profiles of
⊗n
i=1D1,Yi is the set of strategy profiles of the normal form game,
and fixpoints of B⊗n
i=1 D1,Yi
(∗, k) are Nash equilibria by definition.
The set of strategy profiles follows since Σ : Gamev → Set is a symmetric monoidal functor. For the lens we have
V
((
n⊗
i=1
D1,Yi
)
(σ)
)
= V
(
n⊗
i=1
D1,Yi(σi)
)
=
n∏
i=1
V(D1,Yi(σi)) =
n∏
i=1
σi = σ
We prove the claim about best responses by induction on n. When n = 1, we have by definition that (σ1, σ
′
1) ∈ B1,Y1(∗, k)
iff k(σ′1) ≥ k(y1) for all y1 : Y1. This has the required form because k(y1, σ−1)1 = k(y1).
For the inductive step, by definition
(σ, σ′) ∈ B⊗n+1
i=1 D1,Yi
(∗, k)
iff
(σ−(n+1), σ
′
−(n+1)) ∈ B
⊗
n
i=1D1,Yi
(L(D1,Yn+1(σn+1))(∗, k))
u(t(G1)⊗ t(G2))⊙ (G1 ⊗ G2) (u(t(G1))⊗ u(t(G2)))⊙ (G1 ⊗ G2)
G1 ⊗ G2 (u(t(G1))⊙ G1)⊗ (u(t(G2))⊙ G2)
Ut(G1),t(G2) ⊙ (G1 ⊗ G2)
lG1⊗G2 XG,H,u(t(G1)),u(t(G2))
lG1 ⊗ lG2
(G1 ⊗ G2)⊙ u(s(G1)⊗ s(G2)) (G1 ⊗ G2)⊙ (u(s(G1))⊗ u(s(G2)))
G1 ⊗ G2 (G1 ⊙ u(s(G1))) ⊗ (G2 ⊙ u(s(G2)))
(G1 ⊗ G2)⊙ Us(G1),s(G2)
rG1⊗G2 Xu(s(G1)),u(s(G2)),G1,G2
rG1 ⊗ rG2
((I1 ⊗ I2)⊙ (H1 ⊗H2))⊙ (G1 ⊗ G2) ((I1 ⊙H1)⊗ (I2 ⊙H2))⊙ (G1 ⊗ G2)
(I1 ⊗ I2)⊙ ((H1 ⊗H2)⊙ (G1 ⊗ G2)) ((I1 ⊙H1)⊙ G1)⊗ ((I2 ⊙H2)⊙ G2)
(I1 ⊗ I2)⊙ ((H1 ⊙ G1)⊗ (H2 ⊙ G1)) (I1 ⊙ (H1 ⊙ G1))⊗ (I2 ⊙ (H2 ⊙ G2))
XH1,H2,I1,I2 ⊙ (G1 ⊗ G2)
XH1⊙G1,H2⊙G2,I1,I2
aI1⊗I2,H1⊗H2,G1⊗G2
(I1 ⊗ I2)⊙ XG1,G2,H1,H2
XG1,G2,I1⊙H1,I2⊙H2
aI1,H1,G1 ⊗ aI2,H2,G2
Fig. 7. Axioms for theorem 1, part 1
and
(σn+1, σ
′
n+1) ∈ BD1,Yn+1
(
R
((
n⊗
i=1
D1,Yi
)
(σ−(n+1))
)
(∗, k)
)
Writing
L(D1,Yn+1(σn+1))(∗, k) = (∗, kL)
and
R
((
n⊗
i=1
D1,Yi
)
(σ−(n+1))
)
(∗, k) = (∗, kR)
we can directly calculate
kL(y−(n+1)) = k(y−(n+1), σn+1)−(n+1)
and
kR(yn+1) = k(σ−(n+1), yn+1)n+1
u((X1 ⊗X2)⊗X3) u(X1 ⊗ (X2 ⊗X3))
u(X1 ⊗X2)⊗ u(X3) u(X1)⊗ u(X2 ⊗X3)
(u(X1)⊗ u(X2))⊗ u(X3) u(X1)⊗ (u(X2)⊗ u(X3))
u(αX1,X2,X3)
αu(X1),u(X2),u(X3)
UX1⊗X2,X3
UX1,X2 ⊗ u(X3)
UX1,X2⊗X3
u(X1)⊗ UX2,X3
((H1 ⊗H2)⊗H3)⊙ ((G1 ⊗ G2)⊗ G3) (H1 ⊗ (H2 ⊗H3)) ⊙ (G1 ⊗ (G2 ⊗ G3))
((H1 ⊗H2)⊙ (G1 ⊗ G2))⊗ (H3 ⊙ G3) (H1 ⊙ G1)⊗ ((H2 ⊗H3)⊙ (G2 ⊗ G3))
((H1 ⊙ G1)⊗ (H2 ⊙ G2))⊗ (H3 ⊙ G3) (H1 ⊙ G1)⊗ ((H2 ⊙ G2)⊗ (H3 ⊙ G3))
αH1,H2,H3 ⊙ αG1,G2,G3
αH1⊙G1,H2⊙G2,H3⊙G3
XG1⊗G2,G3,H1⊗H2,H3
XG1,G2,H1,H2 ⊗ (H3 ⊙ G3)
XG1,G2⊗G3,H1,H2⊗H3
(H1 ⊙ G1)⊗ XG2,G3,H2,H3
Fig. 8. Axioms for theorem 1, part 2
By the inductive hypothesis, the first condition
(σ−(n+1), σ
′
−(n+1)) ∈ B
⊗
n
i=1 D1,Yi
(∗, kL)
holds iff for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n and all yj : Yj ,
kL((σ
′
−(n+1))j , (σ−(n+1))−j)j ≥ kL(yj , (σ−(n+1))−j)j
After substituting kL this is equivalent to
(k((σ′−(n+1))j , (σ−(n+1))−j , σn+1)−(n+1))j ≥ (k(yj , (σ−(n+1))−j , σn+1)−(n+1))j
and hence, after composing projectors, to
k(σ′j , σ−j)j ≥ k(yj , σ−j)j
The second condition
(σn+1, σ
′
n+1) ∈ BD1,Yn+1 (∗, kR)
holds by definition iff for all yn+1 : Yn+1,
kR(σ
′
n+1) ≥ kR(yn+1)
which is
k(σ−(n+1), σ
′
n+1)n+1 ≥ k(σ−(n+1), yn+1)n+1
u(I ⊗X) u(I)⊗ u(X)
u(X)
XI,X
λu(X)u(λX)
(u(I) ⊗H)⊙ (u(I) ⊗ G) (u(I) ⊙ u(I))⊗ (H⊙ G)
H⊙ G u(I)⊗ (H⊙ G)
Xu(I),G,u(I),H
λH ⊙ λG lu(I) ⊗ (H⊙ G)
λH⊙G
u(X ⊗ I) u(X)⊗ u(I)
u(X)
XX,I
ρu(X)u(ρX)
(H⊗ u(I))⊙ (G ⊗ u(I)) (H⊙ G)⊗ (u(I)⊙ u(I))
H⊙ G (H⊙ G)⊗ u(I)
XG,u(I),H,u(I)
ρH ⊙ ρG (H⊙ G)⊗ ru(I)
ρH⊙G
Fig. 9. Axioms for theorem 1, part 3
u(X1 ⊗X2) u(X1)⊗ u(X2)
u(X2 ⊗X1) u(X2)⊗ u(X1)
UX1,X2
u(σX1,X2) σu(X1),u(X2)
UX2,X1
(H1 ⊗H2)⊙ (G1 ⊗ G2) (H2 ⊗H1)⊙ (G2 ⊗ G1)
(H1 ⊙ G1)⊗ (H2 ⊙ G2) (H2 ⊙ G2)⊗ (H1 ⊙ G1)
σH1,H2 ⊙ σG1,G2
XG1,G2,H1,H2 XG2,G1,H2,H1
σH1⊙G1,H2⊙G2
Fig. 10. Axioms for theorem 1, part 4
Putting these two conditions together, we have the inductive hypothesis for n+ 1.
Proof (theorem 4). Let
GX1,...,Xn =
n⊙
i=1
D∆X1,...,Xi : I 7−→
(
n∏
i=1
Xi,R
n
)
We prove that GX1,...,Xn is given explicitly as follows, up to globular isomorphism. The set of strategy profiles is
Σ(GX1,...,Xn) =
n∏
i=1

i−1∏
j=1
Xj → Xi


For σ : Σ(GX1,...,Xn), the lens GX1,...,Xn(σ) is the unique one with
V(GX1,...,Xn(σ))(∗) = v
σ
For k :
∏n
i=1Xi → R
n, the best response relation
(σ, σ′) ∈ BGX1,...,Xn (∗, k)
holds iff for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and all xi : Xi,
k
(
vσ
(vσ)i−11 ,σ
′
i
((vσ)i−11 )
)
i
≥ k
(
vσ
(vσ)i−11 ,xi
)
i
We prove the first claim by induction on n. It is straightforward to check the base case GX1 = D
∆
X1
: I 7−→ (X1,R).
The inductive step is
GX1,...,Xn,Xn+1 = D
∆
X1,...,Xn,Xn+1
⊙ GX1,...,Xn
Its set of strategies is
Σ(GX1,...,Xn,Xn+1) = Σ(GX1,...,Xn)× Σ(D
∆
X1,...,Xn,Xn+1
)
=
n∏
i=1

i−1∏
j=1
Xj → Xi

×

 n∏
j=1
Xj → Xn+1


=
n+1∏
i=1

i−1∏
j=1
Xj → Xi


The lens is
V(GX1,...,Xn,Xn+1(σ))(∗) = (V(D
∆
X1,...,Xn,Xn+1
(σn+1)) ◦ V(GX1,...,Xn(σ−(n+1))))(∗)
= V(D∆X1,...,Xn,Xn+1(σn+1))(v
σ−(n+1) )
= (vσ−(n+1) , σn+1(v
σ−(n+1)))
= vσ
For k :
∏n+1
i=1 Xi → R
n+1, the best response relation
(σ, σ′) ∈ BGX1,...,Xn,Xn+1 (∗, k)
holds iff
(σ−(n+1), σ
′
−(n+1)) ∈ BGX1,...,Xn (∗,K(D
∆
X1,...,Xn,Xn+1
(σn+1))(k)) (1)
and
(σn+1, σ
′
n+1) ∈ BD∆
X1,...,Xn,Xn+1
(V(GX1,...,Xn(σ−(n+1)))(∗), k) (2)
In condition 1, the continuation is
K(D∆X1,...,Xn,Xn+1(σn+1))(k) :
n∏
i=1
Xi → R
n
x 7→ uD∆
X1,...,Xn,Xn+1
(σn+1)(x, k(vD∆X1,...,Xn,Xn+1(σn+1)
(x))) = k(x, σn+1(x))−(n+1)
By the inductive hypothesis, this relation holds iff for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and xi : Xi,
K(D∆X1,...,Xn,Xn+1(σn+1))(k)
(
vσ
(vσ)i−11 ,σ
′
i
((vσ)i−11 )
)
i
≥ K(D∆X1,...,Xn,Xn+1(σn+1))(k)
(
vσ
(vσ)i−11 ,xi
)
The left hand side of this inequation is
K(D∆X1,...,Xn,Xn+1(σn+1))(k)
(
vσ
(vσ)i−11 ,σ
′
i
((vσ)i−11 )
)
i
=
(
k
(
vσ
(vσ)i−11 ,σ
′
i
((vσ)i−11 )
, σn+1
(
vσ
(vσ)i−11 ,σ
′
i
((vσ)i−11 )
))
−(n+1)
)
i
= k
(
vσ
(vσ)i−11 ,σ
′
i
((vσ)i−11 )
)
i
and similarly the right hand side is
K(D∆X1,...,Xn,Xn+1(σn+1))(k)
(
vσ
(vσ)i−11 ,xi
)
= k
(
vσ
(vσ)i−11 ,xi
)
i
In condition 2, by the inductive hypothesis the history is
V(GX1,...,Xn(σ−(n+1)))(∗) = v
σ−(n+1)
By definition of D∆X1,...,Xn,Xn+1 , condition 2 holds iff
k(vσ−(n+1) , σ′n+1(v
σ−(n+1)))n+1 ≥ k(v
σ−(n+1) , xn+1)n+1
for all xn+1 : Xn+1. The left hand side of this inequation is
k(vσ−(n+1) , σ′n+1(v
σ−(n+1)))n+1 = k(v
σ
(vσ)n1 ,σ
′
n+1((v
σ)n1 )
)n+1
and similarly the right hand side is
k(vσ−(n+1) , xn+1)n+1 = k(v
σ
(vσ)n1 ,xn+1
)n+1
Putting together conditions 1 and 2, we obtain the inductive hypothesis for n+ 1.
Next we prove by induction on i that there is a bijective correspondence between:
• States α of
n⊙
j=n−i+1
D∆X1,...,Xj :

n−i∏
j=1
Xj ,R
n−i

 7−→

 n∏
j=1
Xj ,R
n


that are of the form
α =
n⊙
j=n−i+1
αj
where each αj is a state of D
∆
X1,...,Xj
• Strategy profiles
σnn−i+1 :
n∏
j=n−i+1
(
j−1∏
l=1
Xl → Xj
)
with the property that for all j ≥ n− i+ 1, all subgames x :
∏j−1
l=1 Xl and all deviations xj : Xj ,
k(vσx,σj(x))j ≥ k(v
σ
x,xj
)j
In the base case i = 1, we have immediately that states α of D∆X1,...,Xn over k are in bijection with strategies σn :∏n−1
l=1 Xl → Xn with the property that for all subgames x :
∏n−1
j=1 Xj and all deviations xn : Xn,
k(vσx,σn(x))n = k(x, σn(x))n ≥ k(x, xn)n = k(v
σ
x,xn
)n
For the inductive step, a ⊙-separable state α of
⊙n
j=n−iD
∆
X1,...,Xj
is of the form α = α′ ⊙αn−i, where αn−i is a state of
D∆X1,...,Xn−i and α
′ is a ⊙-separable state of
⊙n
j=n−i+1 D
∆
X1,...,Xj
. This situation is depicted in figure 11. By the inductive
hypothesis, the latter are in bijection with strategy profiles
σ :
n∏
j=n−i+1
(
j−1∏
l=1
Xl → Xj
)
with the property that for all j ≥ n− i+ 1, all subgames x :
∏j−1
l=1 Xl and all deviations xj : Xj ,
k(vσx,σj(x))j ≥ k(v
σ
x,xj
)j
The state αn−i is over the continuation
K



 n⊙
j=n−i+1
D∆X1,...,Xj

 (σ)

 (k) : n−i∏
j=1
Xj → R
n−i
We call this continuation k′. It is given by
k′(x) =
(
k
(
vσ
′
x
))n−i
1
Thus states αn−i with the property that the composition α
′ ⊙ αn−i is well-defined are in bijection with strategies
σn−i : Σ
(
D∆X1,...,Xn−i
)
=
n−i−1∏
j=1
Xj → Xn−i
with the property that for all histories
h :
n−i−1∏
j=1
Xj ∼= V

n−i−1∏
j=1
Xj ,R
n−i−1


and all deviations xn−i : Xn−i,
k′(h, σn−i(h))n−i ≥ k
′(h, xn−i)n−i
I I I

n−i−1∏
j=1
Xj ,R
n−i−1



n−i∏
j=1
Xj ,R
n−i



 n∏
j=1
Xj ,R
n


u(I)
1
u(I)
1
D∆X1,...,Xn−i
n−i−1∏
j=1
Xj → Xn−i
n⊙
j=n−i+1
D∆X1,...,Xj
n∏
j=n−i+1
(
j−1∏
l=1
Xl → Xj
)
kk′σn−i
σ′
Fig. 11. Inductive step of theorem 4
that is to say
k
(
vσ
′
h,σn−i(h)
)
n−i
≥ k
(
vσ
′
h,xn−i
)
n−i
Putting these together gives equivalence to the inductive hypothesis for i+ 1.
The second claim of the theorem follows by taking i = n.
Proof (proposition 29). We first prove that the projections pij satisfy the axioms of a morphism of open games. For a strategy
profile σ :
∏
i:I Σ(Gi) the diagram
(∐
i:I
Xi, S
) (∐
i:I
Yi, R
)
(Xj , S) (Yj , R)
∐
i:I Gi(σi)
Gj(σj)
(ιj , S) (ιj , R)
commutes by the universal property of the coproduct in Lens. The second axiom of morphisms holds directly by definition.
Suppose we have an open game H : Φ 7−→ Ψ and a family of morphisms αi : H 7−→ Gi. We have unique choices for the
s, t and Σ-components of the universal morphism, namely
Φ Ψ
(∐
i:I
Xi, S
) (∐
i:I
Yi, R
)
H
Σ(H)
∏
i:I
Gi
∏
i:I
Σ(Gi)
[s(αi)]i:I [t(αi)]i:I〈Σ(αi)〉i:I
It suffices to prove that this does indeed define a morphism of open games. For a strategy profile σ : Σ(H), commutativity of
Φ Ψ
(∐
i:I
Xi, S
) (∐
i:I
Yi, R
)
H(σ)
∐
i:I
Gi(Σ(αi)(σ))
[s(αi)]i:I [t(αi)]i:I
follows from the individual αi being morphisms.
For the second axiom, let σ, σ′ : Σ(H), ιj(h) :
∐
i:I Xi and k : K(Ψ). Suppose that
(σ, σ′) ∈ BH(V(s(αj))(h), k)
Since
V([s(αi)]i:I)(ιj(h)) = V(s(αj))(h)
by the second axiom of αj we have
(Σ(αj)(σ),Σ(αj)(σ
′)) ∈ BGj (h,K(t(αj))(k))
Since the diagram
Yj R
∐
i:I
Yi
K(t(αj))(k)
ιj K([t(αi)]i:I)(k)
commutes, it follows that
(〈Σ(αi)〉i:I (σ), 〈Σ(αi)〉i:I (σ
′)) ∈ B∏
i:I Gi
(ιj(h),K([t(αi)]i:I)(k))
as required.
